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Abstract
This paper concerns maximizing the minimum achievable secrecy rate of a two-way relay network
in the presence of an eavesdropper, in which two nodes aim to exchange messages in two hops, using a
multi-antenna relay. Throughout the first hop, the two nodes simultaneously transmit their messages to
the relay. In the second hop, the relay broadcasts a combination of the received information to the users
such that the transmitted signal lies in the null space of the eavesdropper’s channel; this is called null
space beamforming (NSBF). The best NSBF matrix for maximizing the minimum achievable secrecy
rate is studied, showing that the problem is not convex in general. To address this issue, the problem
is divided into three sub-problems: a close-to-optimal solution is derived by using the semi-definite
relaxation (SDR) technique. Simulation results demonstrate the superiority of the proposed method w.r.t.
the most well-known method addressed in the literature.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure data transmission is regarded as one of the main challenges in wireless networks. This is due to
the nature of the wireless medium, where any illegitimate node can hear over-the-air messages. There have
been some attempts to alleviate this problem to protect transmitted information against eavesdropping. In
a landmark paper, Wyner introduced the notion of physical layer security and showed that as long as the
source-to-eavesdropper channel is a degraded version of the source-to-destination channel, the data can
be securely transmitted [1]. Also, Wyner defined the secrecy capacity as the maximum transmission rate
below which the private message could be sent reliably from the source to the legitimate destination.
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2There have been some attempts to explore the secrecy capacity of a variety of network topologies,
including so-called relay-assisted networks which are regarded as a promising solution to enhancing
the quality of wireless networks [2], [3]. There have also been some attempts to seek effective coding
strategies at relays to enhance physical layer security [4]–[6].
In addition, two-way relaying is mostly regarded as a spectrally efficient solution, e.g., see [8], [9]. It
is desirable to investigate the reliability of such networks from the physical layer security perspective.
Motivated by this, some research has explored the security of two-way relaying [10]–[12]. Also, the
impact of multi-antenna relaying on physical layer security has been investigated [13]–[15].
It should be noted that different strategies may be employed at relays; the literature mostly addresses
the amplify-and-forward (AF) strategy. This is largely due to the simplicity of this strategy, since it
merely transmits a scaled version of the incoming signal to the destination. Nevertheless, when a relay
is an untrusted node of the network, the AF strategy is a promising approach, because the relay is not
required to go through the information bits. The secrecy capacity of a two-way channel incorporating
some single-antenna AF relays has been investigated in [11].
One of the main objectives pursued in [11] was obtaining the scaling factors associated with the relays
to maximize the minimum achievable secrecy rates (ASRs) of transmitting ends, assuming the relays are
subject to a sum power constraint. Moreover, the relay-to-eavesdropper channel information is known
globally at the relays; thus, the transmitted signal vector from relays resides in the null space of the
relay-to-eavesdropper channel. Given this, the eavesdropper does not receive any information throughout
the second hop. This enhances the overall secrecy capacity. Accordingly, [11] demonstrated that the
incorporated NSBF simplifies the underlying optimization problem, where the sub-optimal solution is
numerically computed.
Referring to [16], representing the secrecy rates of transmitting ends by R1 and R2, the secrecy
rate region is identified by applying three constraints on R1 and R2 as R1 ≤ Rup1 , R2 ≤ R
up
2 , and
R1 + R2 ≤ R
up
sum. However, [11] does not take the sum secrecy rate constraint into account; hence,
the obtained result will be an upper bound, as the obtained rates may not reside inside the secrecy rate
region. This is the main drawback of [11].
Moreover, the AF relay can be equipped with multiple antennas to steer the transmitted signal vector
along a desirable direction to maintain specific criteria such as keeping the eavesdropper as ignorant
as possible of the transmitted signal vector by sending the information vector in the null space of the
eavesdropper’s channel. The objective of this paper is to investigate the ASR of a two-way multi-antenna
relay assisted network. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows.
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3First, assuming an NSBF matrix is employed at the relay, the best beamforming matrix, in terms of
maximizing the minimum ASR, is numerically derived. This maximization is performed in the ASR
region obtained in [16] and among all NSBF matrices. It should be noted that due to taking the sum
secrecy rate constraint into account, the method proposed in [11] cannot be employed.
To tackle the problem, depending on the channel realizations, and based on the possibility of locating
the optimal point on each of three borders of the ASR region, three sub-problems are formulated, where
the optimal solution is the best one of the group. To this end, it is shown that these sub-problems are
not convex in general. However, they can be reformulated as three semi-definite programming (SDP)
problems using the SDR method. They can be solved using well-known software packages such as the
CVX package which is employed in the current work [17].
Although the solution of the equivalent SDR problem is an upper bound of the main problem, a
close-to-optimal solution is proposed that is shown to closely follow the upper bound. Numerical results
demonstrate the superiority of the proposed method in terms of the minimum ASR as compared with the
beamforming vector obtained from [11].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the system model and formulates the
individual secrecy rates as well as sum secrecy rate w.r.t. the beamforming matrix at the relay. Section
III discusses the optimization problem and presents further steps towards obtaining a close-to-optimal
solution. The results are presented in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes the paper with findings.
Throughout the paper, complex conjugate, transpose, and Hermitian transpose are denoted by (.)∗,
(.)T, and (.)H, respectively. Also ⊗, Tr(.), vec(.) indicate the kronecker product, the matrix trace operator,
and the vectorisation operator. Upper and lower bold face letters are used for matrices and vectors,
respectively. The absolute value, the 2-norm value, and the N × N identity matrix are represented by
|.|, ‖.‖, and I, respectively. Finally, [x ]+ means max {0 , x}, I (a ; b) denotes the mutual information of
two random variables a and b, and diag(a, b) indicates a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements a and
b.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless two-way relay network consisting of two single-antenna nodes S1 and S2, an
AF N -antenna relay R, and a single-antenna eavesdropper node E as depicted in Fig. 1. We assume that
the eavesdropper is an active and untrusted node of the network, thus, in addition to nodes S1 and S2,
the channel state information (CSI) of E is also available at the relay. This is a common assumption in
similar research including [10], [11].
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Fig. 1. The structure of the considered network
It is assumed that S1 and S2 aim at exchanging messages through the use of a relay in the middle of
transmission in a two-hop fashion, where throughout the first hop, both nodes S1 and S2 transmit signals
x1 and x2, respectively, with powers P1 and P2 to the relay. Thus, the signal received at the relay is
r = f1x1 + f2x2 + nR, and the following signal is received at the eavesdropper,
y
(1)
E = g1x1 + g2x2 + n
(1)
E , (1)
where f1 =
[
f11 , f
2
1 , . . . , f
N
1
]T
and f2 =
[
f12 , f
2
2 , . . . , f
N
2
]T
are reciprocal quasi-static channel gain
vectors associated with S1 − R and S2 − R channels. Also, g1 and g2 denote, respectively, the channel
gains from S1 and S2 to the eavesdropper. Moreover, nR ∼ CN (0, σ2RI) and n
(1)
E ∼ CN (0, σ
2
E,1) are
received noises at the relay and the eavesdropper, respectively.
Then, during the second hop, the relay applies beamforming matrix W to the received signal vector
r and transmits resulting vector s =Wr to the nodes S1 and S2. As a result, the received signals at S1
and S2 can be expressed as,
yri = f
T
i Wfixi + f
T
i Wf3−ix3−i + f
T
i WnR + ni, (2)
where yri for i = 1, 2 represents the received signal at node Si. Also, ni ∼ CN (0, σ2i ) is the received noise
at the reception side of Si with zero mean and variance σ2i . Referring to (2), it should be noted that the
transmission ends should have access to the relay’s beamforming matrix to subtract the self-interference
term, i.e., fTi Wfixi. This can be done by sending this matrix at the start of each transmission block.
Thus, knowing fi and W at node Si, the self-interference term is completely known at this node, hence,
December 2, 2016 DRAFT
5it can be subtracted from yri , which gives,
yi = f
T
i Wf3−ix3−i + f
T
i WnR + ni. (3)
Also, in the second hop, the received signal at node E becomes,
y
(2)
E = f
T
eWf1x1 + f
T
eWf2x2 + f
T
eWnR + n
(2)
E , (4)
where fe =
[
f1e , f
2
e , . . . , f
N
e
]T
contains the relay-eavesdropper channel coefficients and n(2)E ∼ CN (0, σ2E,2)
is the received noise at node E .
Noting (1) and (4), a useful expression of the received signals at E during the two hops can be written
as,
yE =

y(1)E
y
(2)
E

 =

 g1 g2
fTeWf1 f
T
eWf2


︸ ︷︷ ︸
U

x1
x2

+

 n(1)E
fTeWnR + n
(2)
E

, (5)
Considering the ASR received at node Si is denoted by Ri, in [16], under Gaussian codebook assump-
tion and stochastic encoders, it is shown that the ASR region of a two-way wiretap channel is identified
as follows,
R =
{
(R1, R2) : R1 ≤
1
2
[I (x2; y1)− I (x2;yE)]
+, R2 ≤
1
2
[I (x1; y2)− I (x1;yE)]
+
R1 +R2 ≤
1
2
[I (x1; y2) + I (x2; y1)− I (x1,x2;yE)]
+
}
, (6)
where the half factor is due to the fact that the transmission is carried out in two hops. To compute the
mutual information on the right side of the above constraints, using (3) and (5), it follows,
I (x2; y1) = log2
(
1 +
P2
∣∣fT1Wf2∣∣2
σ2R‖f
T
1W‖
2
+ σ21
)
, (7)
I (x1; y2) = log2
(
1 +
P1
∣∣fT2Wf1∣∣2
σ2R‖f
T
2W‖
2
+ σ22
)
, (8)
I (x1, x2;yE) = log2 det
(
I2 +
UMUH
L
)
, (9)
where (9) comes from an equivalent MIMO system model. Also, I2 indicates the 2× 2 identity matrix,
M = diag(P1,P2), and L = diag(σ2E,1, σ2E,2+σ2R‖fTeW‖
2
). Furthermore, referring to (5), and extracting
the mutual information using the entropy function, one can arrive at equations (10) and (11).
Moreover, defining w , vec(WH), it follows,∣∣fT1Wf2∣∣2 = Tr (fT1Wf2fH2WHf∗1 ) (a)= Tr (Wf2fH2 WHf∗1 fT1 ) (b)= vecH (WH) vec (f2fH2 WH f∗1 fT1 )
(c)
= wH
(
f1f
H
1 ⊗ f2f
H
2
)
vec
(
WH
)
= wH
(
f1f
H
1 ⊗ f2f
H
2
)
w,
(12)
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6I (x2;yE) = log2
[
1 +
|g2|
2P2σ2R
∥∥fTeW∥∥2 + |g2|2P2∣∣fTeWf1∣∣2P1 + |g2|2P2σ2E,2 + |g1|2P1∣∣fTeWf2∣∣2P2
|g1|
2P1σ2R‖fTeW‖
2 + |g1|
2P1σ2E,2 + σ2E,1|fTeWf1|
2P1 + σ2E,1σ2R‖fTeW‖
2 + σ2E,1σ
2
E,2
+
σ2E,1
∣∣fTeWf2∣∣2P2 − g1(fTeWf1)∗P1g∗2 (fTeWf2)P2 − g∗1 (fTeWf1)P1g2(fTeWf2)∗P2
|g1|
2P1σ2R‖fTeW‖
2 + |g1|
2P1σ2E,2 + σ2E,1|fTeWf1|
2P1 + σ2E,1σ2R‖fTeW‖
2 + σ2E,1σ
2
E,2
]
(10)
I (x1;yE) = log2
[
1 +
|g1|
2P1σ2R
∥∥fTeW∥∥2 + |g1|2P1∣∣fTeWf2∣∣2P2 + |g1|2P1σ2E,2 + |g2|2P2∣∣fTeWf1∣∣2P1
|g2|
2P2σ2R‖fTeW‖
2 + |g2|
2P2σ2E,2 + σ2E,1|fTeWf2|
2P2 + σ2E,1σ2R‖fTeW‖
2 + σ2E,1σ
2
E,2
+
σ2E,1
∣∣fTeWf1∣∣2P1 − g1(fTeWf1)∗P1g∗2 (fTeWf2)P2 − g∗1 (fTeWf1)P1g2(fTeWf2)∗P2
|g2|
2P2σ2R‖fTeW‖
2 + |g2|
2P2σ2E,2 + σ2E,1|fTeWf2|
2P2 + σ2E,1σ2R‖fTeW‖
2 + σ2E,1σ
2
E,2
]
(11)
where (a), (b), and (c) come from the fact that Tr(AB) = Tr(BA), Tr(AHB) = vecH(A)vec(B), and
vec(ABC) = (CT ⊗ A)vec(B), respectively. By the same token, we have,∣∣fT2Wf1∣∣2 = wH (f2fH2 ⊗ f1fH1 )w, ‖fT1W‖2 = wH (f1fH1 ⊗ I)w, ‖fT2W‖2 = wH (f2fH2 ⊗ I)w. (13)
It is worth mentioning that as nodes S1 and S2 are of a single antenna, there is no proper way of
preventing E from eavesdropping during the first hop. However, in the second hop, the multi-antenna
relay may send its transmitting signal vector in the null space of the eavesdropper’s channel. The main
objective of the current work is to find the best beamforming vector in the above mentioned null space
such that the minimum achievable secrecy rate is maximized, improving fairness in such a network. As
a result, the beamforming matrix at the relay should be adjusted such that the transmitted vector lies in
the null space of the channel gain vector fe. Mathematically speaking, the following constraints should
be applied,
fTeWf1
(a)
= Tr
(
Wf1f
T
e
) (b)
= vecH
(
WH
)
vec
(
f1f
T
e
)
= wHvec
(
f1f
T
e
)
= 0, (14)
fTeWf2
(a)
= Tr
(
Wf2f
T
e
) (b)
= vecH
(
WH
)
vec
(
f2f
T
e
)
= wHvec
(
f2f
T
e
)
= 0. (15)
where steps (a) and (b) of equations (14) and (15) are similar to steps (a) and (b) in (12). On the other
hand, constraints (14) and (15) can be combined into a single letter constraint as wHZ = 0 where
Z ,
[
vec
(
f1f
T
e
)
vec
(
f2f
T
e
)]
. It should be noted that Z is at most rank 2. Hence, the rank (m) of its
corresponding null space matrix G can take the value m = N2 − 2 or N2 − 1. Therefore, w can be
chosen as w = Gc, where the matrix GN2×m has m orthogonal eigen vectors corresponding to the zero
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7singular values of the matrix ZH, and cm×1 is a combination vector, spanning the null space identified by
G. In other words, the columns of G subsume the basis vectors of the null space of Z and w is written
as a linear combination of these vectors. Using this approach, N2 unknown beamforming variables are
reduced to m variables.
Defining Rup1 = 12 [I (x2; y1)− I (x2;yE)]
+ and Rup2 = 12 [I (x1; y2)− I (x1;yE)]
+ as the upper
bounds associated with the first two constraints in the ASR region introduced in (6), using the equality
w = Gc and the equations (7), (8), (10), (11), (12)-(15), and also after some mathematics it follows,
Rup1 =
[
1
2
log2
(
τ1 +
cHΦ1c
cHΣ1c+ σ21
)]+
(16)
and
Rup2 =
[
1
2
log2
(
τ2 +
cHΦ2c
cHΣ2c+ σ22
)]+
, (17)
where the following definitions are being used,
τ1 ,
(
1 +
P2|g2|2
P1|g1|2 + σ2E,1
)−1
, Φ1 , G
Hτ1P2
(
f1f
H
1 ⊗ f2f
H
2
)
G, Σ1 , G
Hσ2R
(
f1f
H
1 ⊗ I
)
G,
τ2 ,
(
1 +
P1|g1|2
P2|g2|2 + σ2E,1
)−1
, Φ2 , G
Hτ2P1
(
f2f
H
2 ⊗ f1f
H
1
)
G, Σ2 , G
Hσ2R
(
f2f
H
2 ⊗ I
)
G.
(18)
Also, noting (6), the upper bound for the sum secrecy rate, defined as Rupsum, can be computed as,
Rupsum =
1
2
[I (x1; y2) + I (x2; y1)− I (x1,x2;yE)]
+, (19)
where, using (7)-(9), and (12)-(15), Rupsum can be simplified to,
Rupsum =
[
1
2
log2δ
(
1 +
cHΦ31c
cHΣ1c+ σ
2
1
)(
1 +
cHΦ32c
cHΣ2c+ σ
2
2
)]+
, (20)
where the following definitions are being used,
δ ,
(
1 +
P1|g1|2 + P2|g2|2
σ2E,1
)−1
, Φ31 ,
Φ1
τ1
, Φ32 ,
Φ2
τ2
. (21)
Fig. 2 shows the ASR region for different cases of constraints w.r.t. the line R1 = R2. Based on different
channel conditions and the chosen beamforming matrix at the relay, the line R1 = R2 intersects one
of the border lines R1 = Rup1 , R2 = R
up
2 , or R1 + R2 = R
up
sum which are depicted in Figs. 2(a)-2(c),
respectively. Fig. 2(d) indicates the case in which the third constraint of (6) is overlaid with the other
two constraints, thus it is a redundant constraint, not to be taken into account. This case only happens
when at least one of the channel gains g1 or g2 takes the zero value. This case represents a rectangular
ASR region and can be considered as a special case of Fig. 2(a) or Fig. 2(b).
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8(a) (b)
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Fig. 2. The ASR region of a two-way channel : (a) when R1 = R2 intersects R1 = Rup1 , (b) when R1 = R2 intersects
R2 = R
up
2
, (c) when R1 = R2 intersects R1 +R2 = Rupsum, (d) a special case of (a) or (b)
According to Fig. 2(a), the point (Rup1 , r2) identifies the intersection point of lines R1 = Rup1 and
R1 + R2 = R
up
sum, therefore referring to (7)-(9), (12)-(15) and (16), and using the equation Rup1 +r2 =
1
2 [I (x1; y2) + I (x2; y1)− I (x1,x2;yE)]
+
, r2 can be computed as,
r2 =
1
2
log2
(
τ3 +
cHΩ1c
cHΣ2c+ σ
2
2
)
, (22)
where τ3 , δτ1 and Ω1 , τ3Φ32. Similarly, (r1, R
up
2 ) is the intersection point of the lines R2 = R
up
2 and
R1 +R2 = R
up
sum. Therefore, using (7)-(9), (12)-(15), and (17), one can write
r1 =
1
2
log2
(
τ4 +
cHΩ2c
cHΣ1c+ σ21
)
, (23)
where τ4 , δτ2 and Ω2 , τ4Φ31. Also, (r3, r3) is the intersection point of the lines R1 = R2 and
R1 +R2 = R
up
sum. Thus by considering (20), r3 can be calculated as,
r3 =
1
2
Rupsum =
[
1
4
log2δ
(
1 +
cHΦ31c
cHΣ1c+ σ
2
1
)(
1 +
cHΦ32c
cHΣ2c+ σ
2
2
)]+
. (24)
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9III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
This section aims to find the best NSBF matrix at the relay, i.e., W or equivalentlyw , vec(WH) = Gc,
such that the minimum ASR of two nodes is maximized, assuming the relay is subject to a peak power
constraint. Mathematically speaking, since knowing c leads to the w, the following optimization problem
should be addressed,
max
R,c
min (R1, R2) s.t. {pR ≤ PR}, (25)
where R denotes the ASR region determined by (6) for a known value of c, R1 and R2 are the ASRs
of two transmitting ends, PR is the total available power at the relay and pR is the relay transmit power,
where noting the relay’s transmit signal vector is s =Wr, the transmit power can be calculated as,
pR = E
{
sHs
}
= Tr
(
WE
{
rrH
}
WH
)
= Tr
(
WQrW
H) (a)= vec(QTrIWT)Tvec (WH)
(b)
= vec(I)T
(
W⊗QTr
)T
vec
(
WH
) (c)
= vec(I)T
(
WT ⊗Qr
)
vec
(
WH
)
(d)
= vec
(
WT
)T
(I⊗Qr) vec
(
WH
) (e)
=wH (I⊗Qr)w = c
HΩRc,
(26)
where in (26) (a), (b), (c), and (d) come from Tr (ATB) = vec(A)Tvec (B), vec(ABC) = (CT ⊗
A)vec(B), (A⊗B)T =
(
AT ⊗BT
)
, and vec(I)T
(
AT ⊗B
)
= vec
(
AT
)T
(I⊗B), respectively. More-
over, the definitionw = vec
(
WH
)
giveswH = vec
(
WT
)T leading to the equality (e). Also,ΩR ,GH (I⊗Qr)G
and Qr = E
{
rrH
}
= P1f1fH1 + P2f2fH2 + σ2RI.
The optimization problem in (25) can be rewritten as
max
c
Q (c) s.t. {pR ≤ PR}, (27)
where Q (c) = max
R
min (R1, R2).
As is noted in the preceding section, Fig. 2 illustrates different possible choices of region R w.r.t. the
line R1 = R2. In each shape, the region R is divided into two sub-regions RSub1 and RSub2 by the line
R1 = R2. In the sub-region RSub1, the value of R2 is less than or equal R1 in all points, thus, we have
min(R1, R2) = R2, where the maximum value of R2 occurs on the intersection of the line R1 = R2
with the boundary of RSub1. Similarly, in the sub-region RSub2, we have min(R1, R2) = R1, where
again the maximum value of R1 resides on the boundary of this sub-region.
In Fig. 2, the sub-figure (d) can be considered as a special case of sub-figures (a) or (b). So, it is
adequate to merely study sub-figures (a)-(c). It should be noted that for each value of c, one of these
regions occurs. Noting this, one way to tackle the problem is to divide the feasible set of c into three
sub-sets, each corresponding to one of sub-figures (a)-(c). Using this approach, the main problem (25)
is replaced by three sub-problems with three different sub-sets, where the one that yields the maximum
December 2, 2016 DRAFT
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value of min(R1, R2) would be the optimal solution of (25). For instance, in sub-figure (a) we have
max min{R1, R2} = Rup1 , where according to Fig. 2 (a) this sub-figure occurs if and only if we have
Rup1 ≤ r2 . Thus, the corresponding sub-problem can be written as,
max
c1
Rup1 s.t. {pR ≤ PR, R
up
1 ≤ r2}, (28)
where the second constraint ensures that sub-figure (a) occurs. Similarly, the second and the third sub-
problems are given, respectively, by
max
c2
Rup2 s.t. {pR ≤ PR, R
up
2 ≤ r1} (29)
and
max
c3
r3 s.t. {pR ≤ PR, R
up
1 > r2, R
up
2 > r1}. (30)
Using the values of Rup1 in (16), r2 in (22), and pR in (26), also noting the logarithm function is
monotonically increasing and τ1 is a positive constant value, the sub-problem (28) can be rewritten as,
max
c1
c1
HΦ1c1
c1HΣ1c1 + σ21
s.t. {c1HΩRc1 ≤ PR,
c1
HΦ1c1
c1HΣ1c1 + σ21
−
c1
HΩ1c1
c1HΣ2c1 + σ22
≤ τ3 − τ1}. (31)
The problem (31) is not convex in general, thus it does not have a trivial solution. To simplify this
problem, the SDR method is employed in the current work. To this end, one can define C1 = c1cH1 and
rewrite the problem (31) as:
max
C1
Tr (Φ1C1)
Tr (Σ1C1) + σ21
s.t. {Tr (ΩRC1) ≤ PR,
Tr (Φ1C1)
Tr (Σ1C1) + σ21
−
Tr (Ω1C1)
Tr (Σ2C1) + σ22
≤ τ3 − τ1, C1  0, rank (C1) = 1},
(32)
where the rank-one constraint is non-convex, and according to the SDR method, it should be discarded.
Furthermore, the objective function of (32) can be simplified using the Charnes-Cooper transformation
[18]. To this end, the scalar ζ1 > 0 and the matrix Z1 are defined such that C1 = Z1ζ1 . Using this approach,
Z1 and ζ1 should be computed such that the denominator of the objective function of (32) times ζ1 takes
unit value. As a result, the problem (32) is changed to,
max
Z1 , ζ1
Tr (Φ1Z1) s.t. {Tr (ΩRZ1) ≤ ζ1PR, Tr (Σ1Z1) + ζ1σ21 = 1,
Tr (Φ1Z1)−
Tr (Ω1Z1)
Tr (Σ2Z1) + ζ1σ22
≤ τ3 − τ1, ζ1 > 0, Z1  0}.
(33)
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The third constraint in (33) is not convex in general. To address this issue, it is assumed that the term
Tr (Σ2Z1) + ζ1σ22 is a constant value and equals t1. Therefore, this problem can be simplified to,
max
Z1 , ζ1
Tr (Φ1Z1) s.t. {Tr (ΩRZ1) ≤ ζ1PR, Tr (Σ1Z1) + ζ1σ22 = 1,
Tr (Φ1Z1)−
Tr (Ω1Z1)
t1
≤ τ3 − τ1, Tr (Σ2Z1) + ζ1σ22 = t1,
ζ1 > 0, Z1  0}.
(34)
As seen, knowing t1, the third constraint of (34) is affine, hence the problem (34) is an SDP problem. This
problem can be numerically solved using the interior point methods embedded in SDP problem solvers,
including the CVX package, which is employed in the current study. Note that a one-dimensional search
should be performed on t1, where the problem (34) should be tackled for each value of t1. Finally, the
best answer is chosen as the solution of (33). In the Appendix, an upper bound is provided for t1 to
restrict the search process in a bounded interval. The following remark discusses the optimal/suboptimal
solution of the original problem in (31).
Remark 1 In (34), the best values of Z1 and ζ1 are denoted by Z∗1 and ζ∗1 , respectively. If Z∗1 is of
rank one, the optimum value of C1 in (32) is given by C∗1 = Z
∗
1
ζ∗
1
. In this case, the optimal value of c in
(31) is the principle eigenvector of C∗1. Otherwise, the principal eigenvector of the matrix C1 = Z
∗
1
ζ∗
1
is a
suboptimal solution, and the objective function of (32) can be considered as an upper bound of (31).
Substituting Rup2 , r1, pR, respectively, from (17), (23), and (26) in the sub-problem (29), a mathemati-
cally similar problem to (31) is obtained; thus, employing the same approach, the following optimization
problem should be tackled for a known value of t2.
max
Z2 , ζ2
Tr (Φ2Z2) s.t. {Tr (ΩRZ2) ≤ ζ2PR, Tr (Σ2Z2) + ζ2σ22 = 1,
Tr (Φ2Z2)−
Tr (Ω2Z2)
t2
≤ τ4 − τ2, Tr (Σ1Z2) + ζ2σ21 = t2,
ζ2 > 0, Z2  0}.
(35)
Since a one-dimensional search for the best value of t2 should be done to get the optimal value, using
the feasibility study, an upper bound for t2 is determined in the Appendix, limiting the search space.
Also, substituting r1, r2, r3, Rup1 , R
up
2 , and pR, respectively, from (23), (22), (24), (16), (17), and (26)
in the sub-problem (30), and defining the slack variable t3 = c3HΦ32c3c3HΣ2c3+σ22 , it follows,
max
c3,t3
(
1 +
c3
HΦ31c3
c3HΣ1c3 + σ21
)
(1 + t3) s.t. {c3HΩRc3 ≤ PR, c3H (Φ32 − t3Σ2) c3 = t3σ22 ,
c3
HΦ1c3
c3HΣ1c3 + σ21
−
c3
HΩ1c3
c3HΣ2c3 + σ22
> τ3 − τ1,
c3
HΦ2c3
c3HΣ2c3 + σ22
−
c3
HΩ2c3
c3HΣ1c3 + σ21
> τ4 − τ2}.
(36)
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Employing the SDR method by defining C3 = c3cH3 and also using the Charnes-Cooper transformation
by defining C3 = Z3ζ3 , for a known value of t3, the problem (36) can be written as,
max
Z3, ζ3
Tr (Φ31Z3) s.t. {Tr (ΩRZ3) ≤ ζ3PR, Tr ((Φ32 − t3Σ2)Z3) = ζ3t3σ22 , Tr (Σ1Z3) + ζ3σ21 = 1,
Tr (Φ1Z3)−
Tr (Ω1Z3)
Tr (Σ2Z3) + ζ3σ22
> τ3 − τ1,
Tr (Φ2Z3)
Tr (Σ2Z3) + ζ3σ22
− Tr (Ω2Z3) > τ4 − τ2,
ζ3 > 0, Z3  0}.
(37)
In order to convert (37) to the standard SDP form, defining t4 = Tr (Σ2Z3) + ζ3σ22 , the above problem
can be solved for a set of values of t4, where the one with maximum objective function is chosen as the
best solution of (37). In fact, a two-dimensional search over values of t3 and t4 should be carried out
to get the optimal solution of (37), where in the Appendix, using feasibility studies, upper bounds for
t3 and t4 are provided to limit the search space. Mathematically speaking, the following problem should
be solved for each value of t3 and t4,
max
Z3, ζ3
Tr (Φ31Z3) s.t {Tr (ΩRZ3) ≤ ζ3PR, Tr ((Φ32 − t3Σ2)Z3) = ζ3t3σ22 , Tr (Σ1Z3) + ζ3σ21 = 1,
Tr (Φ1Z3)−
Tr (Ω1Z3)
t4
> τ3 − τ1,
Tr (Φ2Z3)
t4
− Tr (Ω2Z3) > τ4 − τ2,
Tr (Σ2Z3) + ζ3σ22 = t4, ζ3 > 0, Z3  0}.
(38)
Remark 2 The greatest value among the best solutions of (34), (35), and (38) is a close-to-optimal
solution of the main problem (25). According to simulation results, in most channel realizations, the
optimal solution of the equivalent SDR problem maximizing the objective function in (25) is of rank one.
Thus in most cases, the optimal solution of the main problem is achieved. Simulation results confirm this
assertion, as the obtained solution closely follows the objective function of the equivalent SDR problem,
where according to Remark 1, it is an upper bound of the main problem.
Remark 3 Complexity analysis: For an SDR problem whose unknown matrix is of q × q dimension
and it has p linear constraints, the worst case complexity is O
(
max {p, q}4q
1
2 log (1/ε)
)
, where ε > 0
is the solution accuracy [19]. Due to the employing the SDR technique in this paper, the complexity
of three presented sub-problems, the main problem, and the investigated problem in [11] when using
an N-antenna relay can be calculated as table I. In this table, M1 is the number of searches over
t1 through t4, while M2 is the number of steps to get the best solution according to the bisection
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Problem Complexity
Sub-problem1 O
(
M1 max
{
5,
(
N2 − 2
)}
4
(
N2 − 2
) 1
2 log (1/ε)
)
Sub-problem2 O
(
M1 max
{
5,
(
N2 − 2
)}
4
(
N2 − 2
) 1
2 log (1/ε)
)
Sub-problem3 O
(
M21 max
{
7,
(
N2 − 2
)}
4
(
N2 − 2
) 1
2 log (1/ε)
)
Main problem O
(
max
{
M1J1,M1J1,M
2
1J2
})
= O
(
M21J2
)
Problem in [11] O
(
M2 max
{
3,
(
N2 − 2
)}
4
(
N2 − 2
) 1
2 log (1/ε)
)
TABLE I
THE COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
algorithm presented in [11]. Also, we have J1 = max
{
5,
(
N2 − 2
)}4(
N2 − 2
) 1
2 log (1/ε) and J2 =
max
{
7,
(
N2 − 2
)}4(
N2 − 2
) 1
2 log (1/ε). It is worth mentioning that for large values of N , the proposed
approach scales as O
(
M21N
9
)
, while the method in [11] scales as O (M2N9) where for the same number
of search steps, i.e., M = M1 = M2, the complexity of the proposed approach is M times greater than
that of [11].
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section aims to compare the minimum achievable secrecy rate of the proposed method with the
method given in [11], which to the best of authors’ knowledge is the best-known method addressed
in the literature. This gives an indication regarding the advantage of the current study. Throughout
the simulations, all channel coefficients are assumed to be i.i.d. complex zero-mean Gaussian random
variables. The variances of the f j1 , f
j
2 , g1, and g2, where j = 1, 2, ..., N , are indicated by σ2fj
1
, σ2
f
j
2
, σ2g1 ,
and σ2g2 , which in Figs. 3, 4, and 6 are considered to be of unit value, however, they have different
values in Fig. 5. Moreover, all noise powers, including the noise power at transmitting ends (σ2k with
node number k ∈ {1, 2}), the relay (σ2R), and the eavesdropper (σ2E,k′ with time index k′ ∈ {1, 2}), are
assumed to be of unit power.
Similar to what is done in [11], to have a fair comparison result, for the results presented in Figs.
3, 4, and 5, a quarter of total power budget PT is allocated to both source 1 (P1) and source 2 (P2),
while the remaining power is allocated to the relay (PR), thus we have P1 = P2 = PT4 and PR = PT2 .
It is worth mentioning that for each value of PT , the corresponding optimization problem is solved for
400 channel realizations and the average solution is represented in numerical results. In our proposed
approach, the solution of the optimization problem is the greatest value among the solutions of three
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Fig. 3. The average value of the minimum achievable secrecy rate vs. the total power constraint in a network with a 3-, 4-,
and 5-antenna relay.
sub-problems. Furthermore, the step size values for search over t1 to t4 are set as one five-hundredth
( 1500 ) of the associated interval.
It should be noted that [11] considers some single-antenna relays, while the current study assumes
a multi-antenna relay. Thus, for the sake of fair comparison, the work done in [11] is extended to a
multi-antenna single relay network. Moreover, as is mentioned in Section I, [11] merely considers two
constraints R1 ≤ Rup1 and R2 ≤ R
up
2 , while the third constraint R1 + R2 ≤ R
up
sum is not included in
the constraints when attempting to maximize min(R1, R2), thus the objective function in [11] would
be an upper bound since the incorporated feasible set, i.e., the feasible set identified with the first two
constraints, subsumes the feasible set R defined in (6) with three mentioned constraints.
Nevertheless, one can readily compute W by [11] and then, using that, identify the secrecy rate region
given in (6), where the minimum ASR is calculated over this region through finding the intersection of
line R1 = R2 with the borders of this region. Accordingly, the result can be treated as an inner bound.
In the obtained results, this method is called the enhancement of [11] by applying the third constraint
(ATC).
Fig. 3 illustrates the upper bound curves based on the method discussed in [11], the proposed method,
and an enhancement of [11] with ATC for a network exploiting a 3-, 4-, and 5-antenna relay. Accordingly,
it can be observed that the performance of the proposed method using m-antenna is approximately
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Fig. 4. The upper bound solutions of the equivalent SDR problem and the proposed method vs. the total power constraint in
a network using a 3-, 4-, and 5-antenna relay.
equivalent to that of the enhancement of [11] with ATC when m + 1 antennas are employed at the
relay. Also, as is inferred from Fig. 3, the proposed approach has superior performance w.r.t. [11]. More
specifically, with the same achievable secrecy rate, the consumed power of the proposed approach is about
3 dBW less than that of the enhancement of [11] with ATC, but at the expense of higher computational
complexity. In addition, the associated curves of the proposed method give an indication regarding the
impact of increasing the number of antennas at the relay, showing that for the same minimum achievable
secrecy rate, there is a dramatic decrease in the consumed power.
Fig. 4 is provided to illustrate that the proposed approach is a close-to-optimal solution to confirm the
assertion of Remark 2 in SectionIII. Accordingly, the solution of the corresponding SDR problem, which
is actually an upper bound, is compared to that of the proposed approach, showing that they closely
follow each other.
Fig. 5 illustrates the minimum ASR of the proposed method for various values of σ2
f
j
i
and σ2gi for i = 1, 2
in a network utilizing a 3-antenna relay. Since σ2
f
j
i
and σ2gi can be, respectively, thought as a measure of
closeness of the jth relay’s antenna and the eavesdropper to the source Si, changing these values gives
an indication regarding the impact of node distances on the resulting minimum ASR. Referring to Fig.
5, considering the case of σ2
f
j
1
= σ2
f
j
2
= σ2g1 = σ
2
g2 = 1 as the benchmark, as is expected, one can readily
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Fig. 5. The average value of the minimum achievable secrecy rate obtained by the proposed approach vs. the total power
constraint in a network with a 3-antenna relay for different settings of σ2
f
j
1
, σ2
f
j
2
, σ2g1 , and σ
2
g2
.
observe that increasing both values of σ2
f
j
1
and σ2
f
j
2
increases the minimum ASR. Also, increasing both
channel strengths from users to the eavesdropper, i.e., σ2g1 and σ2g2 , has a negative impact on the resulting
minimum ASR. However, increasing the channel strength of one user to relay does not greatly influence
the result. On the other hand, increasing the channel strength from one user to the eavesdropper has
approximately the same negative impact w.r.t. the case of increasing both user-to-eavesdropper channel
strengths. This is due to the fact that the objective is maximizing the minimum ASR and in this case the
user with the worst-case channel strength to the eavesdropper acts as a bottleneck.
Fig. 6 depicts the impact of increasing transmit power of S1 on the minimum ASR when the available
power at the relay and the transmit power of S1 are, respectively, set to PR = 20 dBW and P2 = 15
dBW, showing that the minimum ASR improves with increasing P1. It should be noted that as the signal
vectors received at the relay are mostly from different directions, the AF relay can simply adjust its
transmit beamforming matrix in such a way that the user’s signal vector with greater power does not
consume most of relay’s power. Thus, increasing power does not have a negative impact. This confirms
the assumption that full power transmission gives the best result.
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Fig. 6. The average value of the minimum achievable secrecy rate vs. P1 in a network using a 3-, 4-, and 5-antenna relay with
PR = 20 dBW and P2 = 15 dBW.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper aimed at maximizing the minimum achievable secrecy rate of a network assisted by a two-
way multi-antenna relay, assuming transmission occurs in two hops. Throughout the first hop, the multiple
access phase, the relay as well as eavesdropper receive combined messages from both transmitters, while
in the second hop, the broadcast phase, the relay makes use of null space beamforming to transmit
the combined information in the null space of the eavesdropper’s channel to enhance the secrecy rate.
Accordingly, a proper beamforming strategy at the relay with the view of increasing the minimum
achievable secrecy rate is tackled and the result is compared to that of [11], which is the best-known
method in the literature, showing that the proposed method outperforms existing work. Moreover, it is
numerically shown that the proposed approach closely follows the upper bound justifying the superior
performance of the proposed method.
VI. APPENDIX
This section aims to provide upper bounds for parameters t1 to t4. To this end, referring to (34), the
optimum value of the following optimization problem can be considered as the upper bound of t1.
max
Z1,ζ1
Tr (Σ2Z1) + ζ1σ22 s.t. {Tr (ΩRZ1) ≤ ζ1PR, Tr (Σ1Z1) + ζ1σ21 = 1, ζ1 > 0}. (39)
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Noting (34) and (38), the optimum solution of (39) can provide an upper bound for both t1 and t4. Also,
referring to (35), the optimum value of the following optimization problem can be considered as the
upper bound of t2.
max
Z2,ζ2
Tr (Σ1Z2) + ζ2σ21 s.t. {Tr (ΩRZ2) ≤ ζ2PR, Tr (Σ2Z2) + ζ2σ22 = 1, ζ2 > 0}. (40)
To find the upper bound of t3 in (36), the following optimization problem is considered,
max
c
cHΦ32c
cHΣ2c+ σ
2
2
s.t. {cHΩRc ≤ PR}, (41)
where after employing the SDR technique and using the Charnes-Cooper method, the upper bound of t3
is numerically derived.
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